Despite a widespread aspiration to eliminate foodborne illness, significant variation exists in responses to outbreaks across national regulatory systems. These differences in international policies have profound implications for food safety, trade disputes, and the coordinated handling of large-scale outbreaks within the globalized food system.
E. COLI OUTBREAKS: A RECURRING PHENOMENON:
Escherichia coli, commonly abbreviated as E. coli, is a bacterium found within the gastrointestinal tracts of humans and warm-blooded animals. While most E. coli strains are benign and contribute to a healthy gut microbiome, specific variants pose a public health concern. Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) is a prominent example, capable of causing severe food-borne illnesses. The primary transmission route for STEC to humans involves consuming contaminated food products (WHO, 2018). These include raw or undercooked ground meat, unpasteurized milk, and raw vegetables that have not been adequately processed or sanitized.
The 2006 E. coli outbreak linked to contaminated spinach in the United States presents a compelling case study for analyzing foodborne illness outbreaks through a multifaceted lens. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) promptly directed retailers to take bagged spinach from shelves and advised consumers against consuming fresh spinach. This was the first instance of an FDA advisory targeting an entire product category rather than a specific brand or product. Media coverage of the 2006 E. coli outbreak took a more measured approach, prioritizing clear communication over sensationalism (Meagher, 2022). News outlets focused on explaining the situation to the public. This included unpacking the FDA's warnings regarding contaminated spinach and keeping viewers updated on the ongoing investigation. Reporters also delved into the potential causes of the E. coli contamination, focusing on agricultural practices. The media narrative primarily framed the outbreak as an issue within the agricultural production system, highlighting potential contamination risks that could occur on farms.
POLICY AND FOOD SECURITY
Public health officials strategically employed securitization theory (Waever, 2007) by portraying the E. coli outbreak as a critical threat to national security. The widespread illness caused by contaminated spinach posed a danger to public health and potential economic disruption. This framing resonated with the public, garnering significant political support for decisive action. The FDA leveraged this securitization to implement stricter regulations. These included increased inspections of spinach farms and processing facilities, along with enhanced international collaboration to trace the source of contamination. Additionally, the securitization approach secured increased funding for food safety research and surveillance programs, which is crucial for preventing future outbreaks.
Securitization often emphasizes preventing large-scale outbreaks, potentially neglecting the everyday challenges faced by low-income families, who usually rely heavily on processed foods like bagged spinach. The outbreak impacted these families due to their limited access to fresh, high-quality food options. Securitization efforts to prevent large-scale threats might miss these underlying social inequalities in the food system (Alkon et al., 2018). The industrial food system, a prime target for stricter regulations following the outbreak, employs many women, often in low-wage and potentially unsafe working conditions. The securitization narrative might neglect these labor issues, which could contribute to food safety risks. For example, pressure to meet production quotas or inadequate worker training could lead to lapses in hygiene standards, increasing the risk of contamination (Carolan, 2013).
The focus on regulating large-scale producers could disregard the potential of local, women-led food systems. These smaller agricultural operations frequently employ and are managed by women. Local food systems can offer safer and traceable food options due to closer relationships between producers and consumers. However, securitization efforts toward large-scale industrial agriculture might miss the valuable contribution these local systems can make to a more secure and equitable food supply chain (McMichael, 2013).
The PARIS School highlights biopolitics, where states prioritize safeguarding the health and well-being of their populations. E. coli and other food-borne disease outbreaks illustrate this, showcasing how food safety has become a central component of governance facilitated by biopolitical factors. Biopolitics delves into the mechanisms by which governmental authority is exercised through the administration and control of the bodies and existence of a population. Biopolitics represents a novel form of power that operates on a distinct level, scale, and scope, utilizing unique instruments and methodologies (Foucault, 1997). In response to the outbreaks, the government implemented more stringent regulations governing food production and distribution practices to prevent future incidents. These regulations include hygiene standards in processing facilities, tighter controls on antibiotics and pesticides in agriculture, and enhanced food traceability systems. However, the PARIS School warns against overly fixating on outbreaks alone. Such a narrow focus may overlook other significant threats to food security, such as the impact of climate change on agricultural productivity, food supply chain disruptions, and the risks posed by resource scarcity leading to food shortages. You cannot have food security without creating insecurity for some particular communities. Shortage of food and a surplus of food affect those who are producing food differently.
The concept of necropolitics explores how state power dictates who lives and who dies, often through manipulating resources. This translates to food security, where unequal distribution systems become a tool for control, paralleling the withholding of resources seen in necropolitics. When you imagine food as a weapon, instead of everyone receiving a fair share, some populations have an abundance while others face scarcity. This can create and persist biased distribution systems that favor certain groups, leaving others struggling for basic sustenance. An example could be when you consider a city where wealthy areas have overflowing supermarkets while poorer neighborhoods have limited access to fresh produce.
In more extreme scenarios, which may or may not be dystopian, food becomes a weapon of punishment. Governments deliberately withhold food from specific regions or communities as a means of control, a method employed throughout history in wars and conflicts. Necropolitics in food security shows that access to food can become a matter of life and death, with those in power wielding the power to determine who thrives and who suffers. In the cases of food-borne illnesses such as E. coli, policies created to safeguard and compensate communities may sometimes only apply to the populations that can afford taxes levied by the government and regulatory failures of enforcement of food safety standards, often driven by profit motives, disproportionately affect marginalized communities lacking political power or economic resources. These communities also face barriers to accessing timely healthcare during outbreaks, sometimes on purpose because of instilled ideas on who gets to have healthcare or not, leading to higher morbidity and mortality rates. Stigmatization of affected groups removes attention from systemic issues, while global food trade dynamics further create and reinforce vulnerabilities, particularly in regions dependent on imported food.
REFERENCES:
Alkon, A. H., Campbell, M. C., & Colangelo, C. (2018). Food insecurity and hunger in the United States: An enduring challenge. Annual Review of Nutrition, 38(1), 303-325. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38239820/
Carolan, M. S. (2013). The real cost of cheap food: Looking beyond the grocery aisle. Earthscan.
Foucault, Michel (1997). Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press. p. 242. ISBN 0312422660.
Hansen, L. (2009). The securitization of climate change and women: Beyond militarized solutions. Security Dialogue, 40(4), 481-498. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-49658-0
Meagher, K.D. (2022) Policy responses to foodborne disease outbreaks in the United States and Germany. Agric Hum Values 39, 233–248 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-021-10243-9
McMichael, P. (2013). Food and agriculture: The history and future of human food security. Polity.
Ole, Wæver. 1995. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” InOn Security, edited by Ronnie Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press. https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/Waever-Securitization.pdf
2018, E.coli, Newsroom, World Health Organization (WHO) E. coli (who.int)
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